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RECONSTRUCTION
by Frederick C. Cuny 
INTERTECT 
Dallas, Texas
Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Taft, distinguished colleagues.
Forty years ago, at a Harvard commencement, Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall announced an offer of American 
assistance to Europe in post-disaster reconstruction and 
recovery. The European Recovery Program, later known as the 
Marshall Plan, was one of the most acclaimed and successful 
initiatives ever undertaken by the United States. In only a few 
years, a major recovery of war-torn Europe was effected, a 
recovery which became the cornerstone of European economic 
unity. Though it benefited recipients and donors alike, it was 
viewed universally, in the words of Winston Churchill, as "a 
genuinely unselfish act".
Since that time, the term "Marshall Plan” has come to denote 
major coordinated efforts to rebuild or reshape war-torn, 
disaster stricken, or economically depressed regions. There 
have been many calls for Marshall Plan-like efforts, usually 
coming in the aftermath of widespread natural disasters, such as 
the recent African famine; and after civil conflicts, such as 
Lebanon, but also to help revitalize strategic areas, such ass 
the Caribbean Basin initiative. Despite these calls, most of 
the programs have fallen far short of their goals.
It is important, as we celebrate this anniversary, to review 
the lessons of that momentous program and see how we might apply 
them to some of the situations we are facing today. 
Historically, we view the Marshall Plan as at an end, a program 
which is completed and which can fade back into history. I 
feel, however, that we should re-examine that effort, divine its 
lessons and use them as a bridge to help resolve problems which 
confront us today. Specifically, these lessons can be applied 
to:
Reconstruction following natural and man-made disasters in 
the Third World. Annually, the United States is called to 
assist dozens of nations in reconstructing and 
rehabilitating their countries and economies in the 
aftermath of large-scale devastation caused by famine, 
earthquakes, hurricanes and civil wars. Despite our best 
humanitarian intentions, however, a combination of 
short-duration commitment, bureaucratic delays and unclear 
responsibility has resulted in a failure to produce 
meaningful, long-term results.
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Regional revitalization of depressed developing countries 
with common problems is the second area where the lessons of 
the Marshall Plan can be applied. Assistance programs to 
the Caribbean, Central America, and particularly to 
famine-prone Africa could all benefit from a re-examination 
of the Marshall Plan approaches and strategies.
The third and most important area where the lessons of the 
Marshall Plan can be applied is in addressing the 
international debt crisis.
While all of these are important, I will focus on 
reconstruction after disasters and what I consider the most 
serious need: international reconstruction stemming from the 
world economic situation.
What was the Marshall Plan and what were its lessons? 
First, it was an offer of assistance; an encouragement to those 
war-torn countries to develop their own plans to recover. It 
was not a pledge of specific sums, but rather a national 
commitment to do what we could to help.
It was bipartisan. Forged by Acheson, Bohlen (who were 
Democrats), Lovett and Clayton (Republicans), it was supported 
by both parties, the press, and, of course, the beneficiaries. 
It was not really a plan, nor even a program. Rather it was a 
framework under which the countries could suggest approaches for 
the U.S. to consider, the guiding criteria being that they 
promote rapid recovery and regional stability. Publicly, the 
policy was "directed not against any country or doctrine, but 
against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos... to permit the 
emergence of political and social conditions in which free 
institutions can exist". While there was undoubtedly a large 
degree of self-interest -- the original draft of Marshall's 
speech by Bohlen had specifically called the program an effort 
to prevent the spread of Communism in Europe -- General Marshall 
and others quickly saw that the program should be offered to 
all, democratic as well as socialist countries, in order to be 
accepted in a skeptical Europe. Initially, its framers hoped 
that the program would be a means of lessening postwar tensions; 
later, it was justified as a bulwark against Communism, and 
finally it was seen as the cornerstone of containment.
What distinguishes the Marshall Plan from its proposed 
successors is that it was an offer to countries which, while 
devastated, were politically and, prior to the war, economically 
highly developed. It contained a mix of programs -- some 
public, some private -- all developed with the full input of the 
benef iciaries.
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A review of the Plan shows many strengths -- and a few 
weaknesses. Among the strengths? It was bipartisan. The 
Administration had close cooperation from Congress, especially 
the leadership. At a time when many Americans wished to 
withdraw from the world, when mothers and wives demanded that 
occupying forces be brought home from abroad, the framers of the 
plan worked carefully to develop a consensus, not only in 
Congress, but among the public at large, to support the 
program. Few efforts since have had anywhere near the same 
degree of bipartisan support.
The program operated through both the private and public 
sector. It openly pursued benefits for both the lender and the 
borrower. It took an area-wide approach, instead of a country- 
specific scheme. It was guided by long-range planning. Despite 
strong U.S. guidance, its appearance was that of an equal 
partnership between the borrower and the lender. Finally, it 
had its "czar”, Averell Harriman. (Anyone who doesn't believe 
that Harriman had ultimate authority in negotiating with his 
counterparts in Europe during this period only needs to look at 
the State Department cables, or rather the lack of them, to see 
how independently he could operate.)
The weaknesses of the program were chiefly political. It 
was immediately seen by the Soviets as an instrument of the 
emerging U.S. containment policy. As such, it hastened the 
permanent division of Europe. Despite the openness of the 
language and the intent of at least some of the authors, there 
was no real attempt to involve the Soviets or their satellites 
in the planning and execution of the program. In retrospect, it 
appears that, while an offer was extended for Soviet 
participation, there was no real planning about how to involve 
them. Had the Soviets agreed, the program may have even been 
doomed to failure and so it's surprising that no "what if" 
studies were done. As perceived by the Soviets, the only action 
left to them was to ring down the iron curtain and to prohibit 
their satellites from participating. Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
which had previously indicated a willingness to participate, 
suddenly terminated the discussions and withdrew.
In summary, the Marshall Plan can be viewed as a very good 
program with some decidedly negative and unforeseen 
consequences.
Now let's have a look at how reconstruction has been handled 
since the Marshall Plan. When the ERP ended, so did the era of 
long-range planning. Planners, in general, were viewed with 
suspicion. After the "New Deal" and strict wartime controls, 
the economy was ready to loosen up and so were the conservatives 
who wanted more freedom in economic, especially industrial, 
sectors. McCarthyism was also on the rise and, with it, a deep 
fear of centralized planning. Indeed, even before the Marshall 
Plan ended, the effort and its authors were criticized for 
"promoting socialism".
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reconstruction demands except for Korea, and even that received 
limited attention. We disbanded the bureaucratic machinery for 
aiding reconstruction, except for the World Bank. The 
industrialized West could now handle its own disasters, and 
responsibility for reconstruction needs in the colonial world 
was left to the imperial powers.
In the 1960s, the Third World began to emerge and expand 
rapidly. With the independence of each new country, new 
problems arose. First the U.S. expanded its aid programs, but 
on a piecemeal and country-by-country basis. An aid pattern 
evolved. Infrastructure and capital-intensive programs would be 
supported by the government or intergovernmental agencies such 
as the U.N. or World Bank; people-to-people and more direct aid 
programs on a smaller scale would be handled by the voluntary 
agencies or nongovernmental organizations.
Almost immediately, economic problems in the developing 
countries began to get out of hand. New trends aggravated the 
inequities of weak economies. There was a virtually spontaneous 
shift of populations with rapid urbanization and increasing 
marginalization of rural sectors predominating among the 
concerns of all the LDCs. Increasing birth rates and the 
construction of dense, overcrowded shanty towns on marginal 
sites increased the vulnerability of the populations to 
disasters.
In discussing reconstruction after natural disasters, it is 
important to understand the linkage of these trends 
(urbanization, marginalization of the rural poor, and increasing 
birth rates) to vulnerability, the linkage of vulnerability to 
disasters and, subsequently and most importantly, the linkage of 
disasters to development.
Typically, the urbanization/disaster cycle works as 
follows: Government policies support industrialization and the 
urban dwellers. The farmers, whose crop prices are often kept 
artificially low to help urban consumers, suffer declining 
profits while receiving reduced levels of services. 
Economically marginalized, they quickly see that they can find a 
better future in the cities. Therefore, they migrate.
Land demand in the cities increases as more people arrive. 
Prices rise. Since good land is too expensive, the poor settle 
in hazardous areas. The costs of building materials also rise, 
so people are forced to build marginal housing. This 
combination of poor sites, poor houses and overcrowding means 
that when an earthquake, cyclone or flood strikes, thousands of 
the poor will be affected. Recognizing poverty as the primary 
root of vulnerability and the poor as the primary victims are 
the first steps towards understanding a need for change in 
current disaster response practices. For if disasters are an 
outgrowth of widespread poverty, how can we expect to reduce 
their impact by concentrating on emergency assistance of a 
short-term, limited duration?
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mechanisms. First, the Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator's 
Office, now called the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, was established in AID to guide American response 
overseas. However, disasters were viewed as an aberration, an 
abnormal situation. AID administrators wanted to get on with 
development, their primary task. Disasters were viewed as a 
short-term event, anti-developmental, something to compete with 
development funding. Universally, there was a failure to link 
disasters with the causes of underdevelopment or slowed or 
retarded development, and a failure to understand that a 
disaster, responded to improperly, could even set back 
development efforts. Most important, especially in the last 
decade, has been a failure of planners to understand the link 
between disasters and the growing debt of the Third World.
A de facto separation of emergency response from 
reconstruction occurred which was later institutionalized. 
Reconstruction was rightly seen as a development issue and 
therefore primarily a Mission responsibility. The emergency was 
wrongly seen as a separate set of circumstances to be guided by 
specialists who would get in and get out without participating 
in reconstruction decisions. To make matters worse, Congress 
set a 90-day limit on emergency aid, segmenting disasters into 
artificially-defined phases, and thereby ensuring that much of 
the aid money would be spent unwisely.
The results? We focus attention on what, in the long-term, 
is really unimportant. Over the years, I’ve met with dozens of 
chief executives immediately after major disasters. What 
presidents and prime ministers want to know is not "how do we 
distribute plastic sheets?", but "how the hell do I pay for 
rebuilding from this mess?"
Compartmentalization of the disaster ensures that we are 
unable to respond quickly with time-sensitive aid. We have no 
basis for providing emergency relief that will lay the 
groundwork for rapid reconstruction. We are unable to 
capitalize on the opportunities created by the disaster (and 
there are many, not the least of which is the collective will to 
make things happen to benefit the victims). We fail to address 
the real and underlying problems. Any assistance that can be 
provided within 90 days is unlikely to have a major impact on 
mitigating the next disaster.
We waste money. No matter how good our intentions, it is 
simply impossible to do good project planning for meaningful 
programs, go through the participatory process that is so vital 
to the success of a good project, and execute and complete a 
program within a 90-day period. Programs planned under these 
conditions will inevitably be cost-ineffective.
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countries. This
serious problem, however, is that we may 
create or fuel long-term problems for these 
is especially the case regarding external debt.
There is a growing awareness of these problems. In October 
1986, a GAO report entitled "Time-Critical Aid" questioned AID’s 
ability to provide meaningful and timely reconstruction 
assistance. The report discusses AID’s administration of 
reconstruction projects in three Andean countries after floods 
and droughts induced by El Nino. It suggests steps that the 
agency can take to improve the future delivery of time-critical 
reconstruction assistance. In general, the report found that 
reconstruction was slow, primarily due to the Agency’s:
- not fully utilizing alternatives available for flexible 
funding and programming;
- applying regular development assistance programming and 
implementation procedures instead of emergency procedures;
- applying standard procurement and contracting rules to 
obtain certain commodities; and
not establishing 
components.
high priorities for time-critical
I generally agree with the findings of the GAO report. 
However, even if these problems could be corrected, there would 
still be long delays and ineffective response. This is 
principally due to:
- The administrative compartmentalization of disasters and 
assignment of responsibilities to different entities 
within AID. Compartmentalization could be overcome if 
sufficient "bridges" between the emergency and 
reconstruction periods are established and both OFDA and 
AID Mission personnel are jointly trained and prepared for 
the transition from one to the other.
- There are no standard or even preferred approaches or 
programs for reconstruction assistance. Most
reconstruction activities can best be described as 
"reinventing the wheel”. In most cases, U.S.
reconstruction assistance follows the same patterns. Our 
actions are usually proscribed by the type of disaster and 
the type of damages incurred. The development of standard 
reconstruction approaches for housing, agriculture, and 
small business sectors and the development of guidelines 
and standard ' procedures, integrating many of the 
contracting recommendations spelled out in the GAO report, 
would go a long way toward speeding our reconstruction 
assistance.
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opportunities that are available for linking 
reconstruction programs to post-disaster emergency 
assistance. For example, housing reconstruction commonly
involves self-help reconstruction of housing. In the
emergency phase, the groundwork could be laid by providing 
building materials such as Cl sheets which could be used 
for temporary shelter and later incorporated into 
permanent housing through the self-help process. This 
could be even further speeded if the standard approaches 
and programs mentioned above were developed.
In recent years, AID has been a pioneer in promoting 
disaster preparedness as the best means of improving management 
and coordination of emergencies. It only follows that by laying 
the groundwork during emergency operations, we can establish a 
linkage to more effective and timely reconstruction assistance.
These comments should in no way detract from the fine work 
of OFDA. Under the leadership of Mrs. Taft and her predecessor, 
General Becton, tremendous strides have been made in the field 
of emergency preparedness and improving emergency response. 
There has been much progress in preparedness and mitigation 
efforts in many of the most disaster-prone countries. Likewise, 
the task force on the African drought shows that AID can draw 
the best and brightest of its staff together to effectively 
manage crises in remote and difficult regions. Recent work by 
Food-For-Peace, especially evaluations of their response to 
emergency situations, has gone a long way toward improving our 
aid in that sector. But, despite these improvements in 
emergency response, the efforts in reconstruction and long-term 
planning to alleviate the causes of disasters still lag far 
behind.
Let’s compare the way we handle reconstruction today with 
the Marshall Plan. Does it have the key strengths? First, is 
it bipartisan? Yes. Americans of both parties are unanimous in 
showing their concern for victims around the world.
Second, 
efforts? 
world, as 
concerts. 
burnout.
is there a national commitment to reconstruction 
Emergency assistance can capture the emotions of the 
demonstrated by the "Band Aid" and "We Are The World" 
But long-term reconstruction gets lost in donor
Do reconstruction efforts today operate through both the 
public and private sectors? Only marginally.
Is there a partnership between the U.S. and the recipients? 
Marginally, but generally we dictate the responses or provide a 
rigid framework under which countries can borrow money.
Are we guided by long-range planning? Definitely not.
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Do reconstruction efforts, at the country level, have a 
"czar" or even a coordinating body? No.
On the positive side, our reconstruction efforts today still 
exhibit one of the principal strengths of the Marshall Plan. In 
other words, they are still seen as genuine humanitarian 
concern, not an instrument of U.S. policy. This is surprising, 
especially when viewed in the context of where our aid monies 
are spent. Yet, it would seem that reconstruction assistance is 
usually seen as a positive intervention by all concerned. This 
is a key point, for if reconstruction aid is still seen as a 
positive and unselfish act, we had best get our house in order 
so we can continue to capitalize on goodwill.
Therefore, I challenge AID to reconsider our reconstruction 
approaches. I recommend that reconstruction be given a higher 
priority than relief. I further recommend the establishment of 
a focal point for reconstruction coordination at a senior level 
in AID with a small permanent staff and, when the need arises, a 
temporary staff drawn from, among others, Treasury. AID, State, 
and Commerce.
Notice the emphasis on Treasury. Reconstruction is 
primarily a financial matter. More and more, a country’s 
ability to reconstruct is affected by its debt situation. This 
is the most important area where lessons of the Marshall Plan 
can and should be applied today, for I believe the international 
debt crisis we are facing now calls for major economic 
reconstruction.
It might be helpful to review the origins of the current 
debt crisis. In the early 1960s, demands for development funds 
increased. As newly-independent countries came out from under 
their colonial umbrella, the resources of those countries, 
especially the mineral and petroleum resources, were no longer 
"captive" and could be used as collateral on the international 
banking market. Fed by a feeling that countries couldn’t 
default, and encouraged by the World Bank and the lending 
countries, private banks began to loan more and more money to 
developing countries. In the 1970s, with the rising price of 
oil, it appeared that many of the oil-producing Third World 
nations would have unlimited access to capital to repay the 
large notes that were piling up.
Countries overborrowed; banks overlent. Many of the 
projects that were financed were ill-conceived, poorly planned 
and poorly executed. In too large a number of cases, corruption 
was rampant. Yet, the loans continued to flow.
By 1980, we were beginning to see the signs of trouble and 
by 1982, when Mexico announced that it would be unable to meet 
its interest payments, shock waves jolted the banking 
community.
9We at INTERTECT began noting the problems in 1979 in
Jamaica. In the aftermath of minor flooding in the western part 
country, the government was unable to obtain even small 
help the disaster victims. In 1981, while working in 
discovered that 42% of the national budget was spent 
debt contracted to finance cyclone reconstruction 
In 1984, in Madagascar, a simple program to
reconstruet housing in two cities in the aftermath of a cyclone 
was severely hampered when the government informed us that its 
foreign currency reserves were less than $1 million. The 
situation was so bad that the government couldn’t release the
large amounts of its own currency from Title I food sales for
reconstruction for fear of putting so much money back into 
circulation that it would contribute to the inflationary spiral.
of that 
loans to 
Fiji, we 
servicing 
programs.
In 1985, in the aftermath of the Mexico City earthquake, the 
government of Mexico couldn’t begin reconstruction until it 
refinanced its debt. (To illustrate the seriousness of the debt 
problem in relation to reconstruction, the Minister of Finance 
once showed me President de la Madrid’s calendar the week 
following the earthquake. Almost 60% of his time was devoted 
not to earthquake response, but to meetings to find a solution 
to the debt problem!)
I am not an economist, just a specialist grappling with 
reconstruction. But I can see where the debt crisis is 
leading. My concern is that we are running out of money and 
options at the same time. In the aftermath of emergencies, we 
are increasingly unable to finance reconstruction and 
rehabilitation projects. Even if we can begin the work, it is 
very rare that we can complete it. For example, in Mexico City, 
the government was only able to rebuild and repair approximately 
40% of the housing that was damaged. The rest lie waiting (only 
a mile’s march away from the National Palace).
If a country does not have immediate access to cash, debt 
refinancing must take precedence, which in turn slows the 
reconstruction process. This, in turn, leads to cheap, 
quick-fix solutions that usually don’t work. In some cases, the 
programs only add to the existing debt and, in those cases where 
the quick-fix solutions are inadequate, the return of another 
earthquake or cyclone can put countries in the position in which 
Fiji now finds itself -- having to borrow once again to replace 
houses rebuilt after an earlier disaster, but not yet completely 
paid for.
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Our traditional approach to resolving the debt crisis is to 
encourage governments to take broad austerity measures. 
However, austerity sears cutbacks for the rural poor. In 
Mexico, it led to reductions in tortilla and milk subsidies and 
a drop in the construction of rural roads and rural schools.
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austerity never results in a reduction of a government’s work
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force, as envisioned by the IMF and others, but a loss of work 
for day laborers, contract employees, etc. Let’s be honest; 
government workers don’t lose their jobs....they vote!
With the loss of jobs, people in rural areas are forced to 
move to the cities. Studies in Mexico showed that, with each 
subsequent cutback, migration to Mexico City and the larger 
towns increased substantially. Also, if Mexico is any example, 
the costs of supplying basic services in the cities is much 
higher than if the people had stayed in the countryside. 
Therefore, austerity produced no short-term benefits and 
actually increased the problems and the cost of resolving them 
in the long-term. In short, the poor are being unfairly 
burdened with a debt from which they derived little or no 
benef it.
I believe the debt crisis is the most serious challenge 
we’ve faced since the post-war period. Growth in the LDCs is 
halted. The Inter-American Development Bank has reported that 
output in Latin America increased 3.9%, although most of that 
was in Brazil. But the net loss, because of population 
increases and a decrease in buying power, has resulted in an 8% 
decline of output per person. Most alarming, the gap continues 
to grow between the rich and the poor. A greater number of 
resources are being concentrated in the hands of a few and this 
maldistribution of wealth is worsening. Capital flight has 
become a major problem. It has been reliably estimated that 
$1 million per hour leaves Mexico.
The political price for these conditions will be high. New 
civilian democratic governments face strong political pressures 
to avoid austerity measures required or advocated by lenders. 
Those paying for the crisis are the already-marginalized poor 
whose standard of living is falling even further. President 
Sarney of Brazil has said, "A debt paid with misery is a bill 
that will eventually be paid by democracy."
The debt crisis also has a major impact on the United 
States. The instability it has caused to our banking system is 
but a small part of the problem. On the domestic scene, it has 
hurt American exports. With most of the money in developing 
countries tied up in paying debts, they have little purchasing 
power for American products. Particularly hard-hit are American 
farmers.
Pressures in the developing world to export at any price in 
order to obtain the needed foreign currency to service the debt 
have resulted in dumping in U.S. markets. The Joint Economic 
Committee reports losses of over one million U.S. jobs and 
billions of dollars to our economy.
Internationally, our failure to take the lead and resolve 
the crisis is generally seen by the LDCs as a major failure of 
U.S. policy, and the U.S., whether rightly or wrongly, is blamed 
for the problem.
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In response to this crisis, there have been a number of 
actions and proposals to try to resolve the situation. These 
can be divided into individual approaches, usually developed by 
borrowers; comprehensive proposals, offered by the lenders; and 
unilateral actions, taken by both troubled lenders and borrowers 
who have run out of maneuvering room.
Among the individual approaches are:
- Debt-for-equity swaps, whereby a loan is sold at a 
discount to a second party, say sixty cents on the dollar, 
and then is redeemed at the central bank of the debtor 
country for local currency to invest in specified 
enterprises within the country; profits repatriated at a 
later time;
- Debt-for-eommodities, where the lender accepts locally- 
produced commodities in lieu of cash which the lenders 
then sell; and
- Other approaches such as factoring companies, exit bonds,
investment notes, retiming of payments to give the
countries a bit more grace between payments, and other
individually-negotiated solutions.
However, the most successful of these -- debt-for-equity
swaps -- have only been successful in wiping out about
$5 billion of an $800 billion total debt. Furthermore, many 
debt-for-equity swaps are worrying financial analysts. They 
could prove to be inflationary. After all, what’s to stop a 
central bank from just printing more money? Others have pointed 
out that it simply replaces foreign debt with domestic debt 
which usually carries a higher interest rate. They have also 
been criticized as a subsidy for businesses who would have made 
the investments anyway, in foreign exchange. There is also some 
criticism within the countries that they are being forced to 
sell their natural resources at a discount. Leftists have been 
especially vocal, calling it "a new form of economic imperialism 
and intervention".
However, there are some bright spots. Some countries have 
limited debt-for-equity swaps to investors willing to match 
local currency with equivalent hard currency. There have been 
some innovative programs proposed in Mexico where debt will be 
exchanged for projects to develop vital infrastructure, such as 
toll roads. There are also proposals to securitize loans, in 
other words, convert them to securities and sell them in a broad 
secondary market like home loans or insurance. Potentially, 
this could increase the number of people and companies investing 
in the Third World.
Without a broader framework, however, individualized 
approaches will have only a limited impact. So, let’s look at 
comprehensive approaches. First and foremost, there is the
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Baker Plan. Presented last year in Seoul, the plan consists of 
three parts. First, the development banks would boost their 
lending by $9 billion for three years. Second, the commercial 
banks would boost their lending by $20 billion in three years. 
Third, the debtors would restructure their economies to 
encourage growth with emphasis on privatization, liberal trade 
policies and foreign investment. Essentially, the Baker Plan 
divides loans into old money and new money. It was initially 
hailed because it recognized that the countries need to continue 
to receive new money in order to stimulate their economies. The 
basic premise of the plan is that the new money could stimulate 
enough growth that both old and new debt could be retired -- an 
assumption which many analysts now view as questionable. 
Basically, the Baker Plan can be summarized as a strategy to 
manage the crisis with the same tools: principally, more 
lending. Unfortunately, this also leads to more debt.
The second comprehensive approach that has received 
widespread notice is the Bradley Plan. As proposed by Senator 
Bill Bradley of New Jersey, the development banks would boost 
their lending by $3 billion, which would be $6 billion less than 
under the Baker Plan. Furthermore, there would be no commercial 
lending. At a world "debt summit", lenders and debtors would 
.jointly work out agreements that would lead to a 3% interest 
rate reduction plus a 3% per year principal reduction for three 
years. In order to qualify for these reductions, borrower 
countries would make internally-generated reforms. In other 
words, they would not be dictated by the United States or other 
lenders. Senator Bradley’s plan is essentially the beginning of 
a programmed write-down of the loans, and he rightly points out 
that, without some interest rate reductions and some forgiveness 
of principal, it will be impossible to recover many of the loans 
and still keep the countries solvent. By reducing the amount of 
interest and principal slightly, the amount of new money that 
needs to be provided will thereby be less. One of the primary 
advantages of the program is that the commercial banks will be 
given some time to get their own financial houses back in order.
Other comprehensive plans have been proposed. Some 
Europeans have proposed recognizing the difference between old 
and new debt and allowing a partial and temporary interest 
deferral on the old debt. Chairman Leutols of the Swiss Bank 
has been particularly vocal in advocating this approach.
Representatives Morrison, LaFalce and Faunteroy have 
proposed an International Debt Management Authority: a public 
agency that would buy loans at a discount and hold or convert 
them to securities to sell on a secondary market. The Authority 
would pass the discount on to the debtors in the form of 
principal reductions.
Owing to the failure of lenders to settle on a workable 
comprehensive approach, a number of countries and lenders have 
unilaterally taken steps to resolve the crisis. Peru has 
limited its payments to 10% of its export earnings, a move which
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at first sent tremors through the banking world, but which has 
not triggered a wave of similar actions by other debtors. 
Nonetheless, unless a comprehensive approach is adopted soon, 
countries with larger debts, such as Mexico and Brazil, may seek 
similar solutions.
In May of this year Citicorp, one of the largest lenders, 
unilaterally chose to increase its loss reserves by $3 billion 
and to reduce its loan exposure to the Third World. In other 
words, it is now treating $3 billion of its debt as
uncollectible.
The Citicorp action has forced other money center banks to 
increase their reserves. This is okay for the larger banks, but 
it threatens the weaker ones -- the smaller regional banks, the 
Bank of America, and especially banks in Texas. This move has 
been widely interpreted as "sending a message" first to 
borrowers that the money centers will no longer go on forever 
restructuring loans and, second, to governments that broader 
government participation is required to resolve the crisis. The 
major casualty of this move, however, is the Baker Plan. For 
now one of its three pillars -- commercial lending -- is out. 
Another casualty may be the loan advisory committees, the 
supervising structure of multi-bank loans, since Citicorp 
operated independently without consulting its partners in this 
move.
So where do we stand? As I said earlier, I feel that we are 
facing a worldwide crisis. Restructuring of debts is not 
enough. A bold stroke is needed. Only through an all-out 
effort on a worldwide basis can we pass from talk to action. We 
are now in an adversarial relationship, lender against borrower 
and, in some cases, lender against other lenders. If the U.S. 
doesn’t take the initiative, others will. In the best case, we 
will lose face for not taking action. In the worst case, the 
debtors will take actions which could severely threaten our 
banking system.
There are remarkable parallels in the crisis today to the 
situation faced by Lovett, Acheson, Bohlen and others in 1947. 
So, let’s review the lessons of the Marshall Plan once again and 
see how they might apply.
Is our approach to resolving the crisis bipartisan? Not 
really.
Is there a national commitment to resolve the crisis? No.
Are we seeking solutions through public and private action? 
Partially, though not effectively.
Is there a partnership between lender and borrower? Not
yet.
Are we guided by long-range planning? No.
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In order to position U.S. banks to participate and to get 
our own house in order, we need to take several measures. 
First, we need to provide special tax relief for banks agreeing 
to reduce interest and principal and especially to cap 
interest. This relief could be a credit to be "played against" 
taxes above their normal operating losses. Credit could be 
given in the form of a certificate which could be redeemed 
against profits sometime in the future.
Next, we need to establish a loan pool to provide new money 
needed for investment. However, this would be limited to about 
half of the Baker Plan requirements, i.e., $4.5 billion. The 
pool would be a combination of development bank and private bank 
monies administered by an international committee of lenders and 
borrowers.
Finally, we should revise the security regulations so as to 
promote individual investments and stimulate the development of 
a secondary market for debt-for-equity swaps and investment.
The goals of these interim measures are:
- to end the adversarial relationship between borrowers and 
lenders;
- to disperse the risk and reduce it to manageable levels; 
and
- to involve the borrowers to a greater extent in resolving 
the problems.
It is imperative that the Administration and Congress seize 
the initiative and work together to develop a bipartisan 
approach to resolve the crisis and (working closely with the 
lending institutions, especially the regionals) develop a 
national commitment for taking the tough measures that are 
required.
While we are working to resolve the immediate crisis, we 
need to begin working on long-term solutions. I recommend that 
we establish a long-range economic planning committee to look at 
how we will provide new money into the 21st century.
Principally, we need to explore new loan structures. Loans 
should be divided into two groups: those that have social
benefit, especially those that directly attack poverty; and 
loans that provide economic benefit but which may have only 
limited immediate impact on resolving economic or social 
problems. Loans given for true development projects should have 
a vastly different loan structure and interest rates. We need 
to explore new incentives for commercial banks to participate in 
these types of loans. This may require special tax breaks or
other means of helping the banks profit for giving loans at a 
much reduced rate.
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Finally, we need to develop new methods to monitor debt and 
to develop corrective mechanisms that can slow debt growth if 
danger levels are reached. Our failure as a nation to recognize 
the warning signs and to let the situation develop as it has is 
a major failure of government economic monitoring. Every 
administration since 1960 is guilty.
In summary, it’s time for action. We cannot continue to 
treat poor countries as commercial clients,' and we cannot allow 
an unjust and inequitable system to force the poor to carry the 
burden for all of our mistakes. We must take action now to 
relieve the burden on the poor, and we must find ways of 
providing new money and giving priority to projects that 
alleviate poverty and improve living conditions around the 
world. If we allow the situation to continue, the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few and the continued 
marginalization of the poor, in both urban and rural areas, will 
lead to problems which we cannot even begin to comprehend.
George Kennan, one of the authors of the Marshall Plan, saw 
that trend developing in Europe and issued a warning whose words 
ring clear today... "Maldistribution of wealth nurtures 
totalitarian movements of both the left and the right. Unless 
the U.S. effects fundamental economic change, world peace will 
be threatened."
